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Warfare 1914-1918 (Great Britain and
Ireland)
By Alaric Searle
The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) participated from the outset in the fighting in France
and Belgium. But compared to Germany and France, Britain’s main strength at the start of the
conflict was her navy rather than her army. While she was more than able to match the
Imperial German Navy at sea, the war on land – not just in France and Belgium, but in Africa,
at Gallipoli, in Palestine and in other theatres – required her to undergo a dramatic process of
mobilization and military improvements. Performance at sea and in the air was not
significantly inferior to her main opponents, although on land it was not as proficient in the
first two years of the war.
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Before the outbreak of war in August 1914, Great Britain viewed itself primarily as a great naval
power. The British Empire had expanded steadily during the second half of the 19th century, primarily
through the country’s industrial might, the strength of the Royal Navy, trade and commerce, and a
sense of imperial mission. This is not to say that the British Army was unimportant; it had fought in a
variety of smaller conflicts in Africa, Asia and in the Crimean War. Despite some military reforms
following the Boer War, Britain was largely unprepared for a major continental war: like other nations,
its military leaders presumed that such a war would only last a matter of months.
The Royal Navy suffered far fewer casualties than the British Army during the Great War, but its
contribution was just as important. In some areas, it proved inferior to the Imperial German Navy,
but, by the end of the conflict, it could legitimately claim to have made a significant contribution to
victory due to its successful naval blockade of Germany. This was a turnaround in events: it had
suffered some early setbacks, performed indifferently at the Battle of Jutland and been unable to
solve the problem of German attacks on British shipping until later in the war. However, it did adapt
successfully to the major challenges, and morale among officers and men remained high throughout
the conflict. It operated in three major theatres: the North Sea, the English Channel and the Atlantic.
When war broke out, the Royal Navy enjoyed fleet superiority over the Imperial German Navy: she
had twenty-four dreadnought battleships, with eleven under construction (Germany had fifteen, with
six under construction, although three were never completed); and nine battle cruisers, with one
under construction (Germany had four). British naval thinking was still dominated by the idea of the
decisive battle at sea. With such superior strength ranged against it, it was unlikely that the Imperial
German Navy would risk an open confrontation. While there was no large-scale naval battle until
Jutland, many of the minor naval engagements suggested German advantages in armour, firepower
and command.
On 22 September 1914, three British armoured cruisers were sunk off the Dutch coast by a lone
German submarine, with 1,600 British sailors drowned. On 27 October 1914, the battleship
Audacious hit a mine off the coast of Ireland and sank. Off the coast of Chile, on 1 November 1914, a
British squadron was overwhelmed by a German cruiser force which demonstrated greater
accuracy in gunnery. Despite these setbacks, two battle cruisers were sent to the South Atlantic,
where they engaged the German East Asian Squadron, commanded by Maximilian Graf von Spee
(1861-1914), sinking two armoured and two light cruisers.
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place. Four British ships were damaged, but the Imperial Navy lost one destroyer, three cruisers and
two torpedo boats sunk, and six other ships were damaged. This engagement suggested that the
British still enjoyed naval superiority. A further clash in the North Sea took place on 24 January 1915
at the Battle of Dogger Bank, which ended in a British victory (although the British had a battle cruiser
and a destroyer put out of action, the Germans suffered an armoured cruiser heavily damaged and
an armoured cruiser sunk, and far heavier casualties in men).
The biggest clash of the war took place at the Battle of Jutland (31 May 1916), which saw the
Germans successfully destroy a greater tonnage of naval vessels. However, they failed to achieve a
decisive victory. The British Grand Fleet suffered 113,300 tons sunk, and the German High Seas
Fleet 62,300 tons sunk. British fatalities were well over double those of the Germans. Although the
battle demonstrated superior German gunnery, the British commander had succeeded in luring the
Germans into a trap. However, Admiral John Jellicoe (1859-1935) did not pursue Admiral Reinhard
Scheer (1863-1928). The Germans hailed the battle as a victory, although in strategic terms they had
failed to reduce the numerical superiority of the Royal Navy and, thus, had not been able to win any
freedom of action in the North Sea or elsewhere. The subject has caused heated debate ever since,
even if it was essentially a tactical victory for the Germans.[1]
After Jutland, there were few serious naval engagements, other than the British attack on the port of
Zeebrugge on 23 April 1918. Although the British were unable to block the canal exits used by
German U-boats, the harbour was no longer capable of sheltering German destroyers. Despite the
lack of further naval action, the Royal Navy succeeded in keeping the German High Seas Fleet
bottled up in its ports for the rest of the war and, hence, unable to launch any decisive attacks.
One of the most critical aspects of naval warfare was the struggle to fend off German U-boats which,
at the start of the war, were not hindered in their operations by Britain’s naval superiority in surface
ships, an advantage which had lulled the British into a false sense of security. The British naval staff
had failed to anticipate the threat submarines would pose; from February 1915 onwards, increasing
submarine attacks were made against neutral as well as Allied merchant shipping.
Even before the German High Command decided at the beginning of 1917 to launch unrestricted
submarine warfare, the tonnage of merchant shipping which the U-boats had sunk was causing
concern. By the spring of 1917, one in four ships bound for Britain was being sunk. The solution to
the problem, the convoy system, was to concentrate anti-submarine measures within the convoy
itself: this combined depth-charges and guns on surface ships with an increase in the number of
ships providing protection. This solution had been rejected by Jellicoe until desperation forced him to
back down. By summer 1917, shipping losses began to fall. The criticism of the Admiralty’s
performance during the war is most justified when it comes to their resistance to the convoy
system.[2]
The Battle against Submarines
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A total of 5,704,416 men served in the British Army between August 1914 and November 1918.
Given that the pre-war army had been a small professional force, which had strongly reflected the
rigid Victorian and Edwardian class system, its expansion during the war led to a dramatic change in
its institutional character. The pre-war officer establishment had been a mere 12,738 men; by
November 1914, 3,627 of them had become casualties, indicating that changes were inevitable. As
the old army was ground down, primarily on the Western Front, the new army which was mobilised
(“Kitchener’s Army”), and, subsequently, the army created by the introduction of conscription in
1916, were faced with campaigns in other theatres of war, most notably in Africa, the Dardanelles,
Mesopotamia, Palestine and Italy.
It should not be forgotten, either, that the British Army recruited 210,000 Irish volunteers during the
course of the conflict (40,000 were killed). Three Irish divisions fought on several fronts: the 10th, 16th
and 36th Divisions. The 36th (Ulster) Division was largely made up of Unionists and recruited from
the Ulster Volunteer Force. If the majority of Protestants and Catholics in Ireland supported the war in
August 1914, matters became more complicated following the Easter Rising of April 1916.[3]
As a volunteer and then a conscript army, the BEF was unable to match the professional ethos of
the German Army. Hence, its tactics were indifferent in the first half of the war, while the
performance of its commanders has also been criticised. But, subsequently, as a predominantly
civilian force, it was able to compensate for early failings through the civilian expertise which flooded
into its various branches of service. There seems little doubt that the more technical branches, such
as the artillery, Signal Service, Tank Corps and Royal Engineers, benefited greatly from the industry
expertise which a citizen army brought with it.
The majority of the divisions of the British Army were engaged during the war on the Western Front.
In the frontier battles from 23 August to 1 September 1914, the BEF (with a strength of around
100,000) significantly delayed the German advance, performing well at the Battle of Mons and Le
Cateau. However, it suffered heavy casualties in these early clashes, including in the First Battle of
the Marne and Aisne counter-offensive. The final major battle of 1914, the First Battle of Ypres
(October-November), largely led to the destruction of the pre-war army. Still, the British had assisted
the French in stopping the initial German drive towards Paris.
The success in 1914 of Field Marshal Sir John French (1852-1925), the BEF commander-in-chief,
was as much due to luck as it was to any particular military skill, and rested in part on the confused
communications during the opening battles. However, he struggled more than the Germans with the
unexpected challenges of trench warfare in 1915. When the BEF launched a major offensive at the
Battle of Loos (25 September-8 October 1915), the British suffered around twice as many casualties
as the Germans. The failure at Loos led to increasing dissatisfaction with French’s command. Sir
The British Army
The Western Front
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Douglas Haig (1861-1928), one of French’s two corps commanders, began to agitate against him.
Haig took over on 19 December 1915, holding command of the BEF until the end of the war.
British infantry tactics under French were too rigid and unimaginative; the BEF was also unprepared
for trench warfare. There was an over-reliance on the power of artillery during offensives, even if
artillery tactics improved rapidly during the course of the conflict, with the perfecting of counter-
battery fire and sound-ranging techniques. Improvements in tactics did start to take place in 1916,
however, with the introduction of various specialist training schools.
There were two major battles which continue to blight the reputation of Haig as the British
commander-in-chief in France: the Battle of the Somme (1 July-18 November 1916) and the Third
Ypres Offensive (31 July-10 November 1917). Their length, and the disputes over the casualty
figures for the British divisions, make definitive judgements problematic. Yet it seems obvious that, at
least during specific phases of both battles, Haig was over-optimistic.
Haig’s command was further overshadowed by the failure to anticipate the German counter-attack
during the Battle of Cambrai (20 November-7 December 1917). Public anger at what appeared to be
the squandering of a great victory through incompetence led to intense political pressure on him. One
result was the purge which took place at the BEF General Headquarters in France: several senior
officers were forced out, including the chief of intelligence, Brigadier General John Charteris (1877-
1946), which weakened Haig’s position.
Perhaps as a result of this reputational damage, and because command proficiency had improved,
Haig became more willing to delegate authority to his corps commanders during the course of 1918.
Nonetheless, the dogged side to his personality helped the BEF survive the German March
Offensive, paving the way for the series of counterattacks which formed the Hundred Days’
Campaign, which drove the German Army back to its frontiers.[4]
One of the strengths of the British Army was its capacity to create an environment conducive to
genuine innovation. One of the best examples of this was the introduction of the tank on 15
September 1916 during the Battle of the Somme. During the war, Britain produced 2,818 tanks. The
tank was not a “war-winning” weapon, yet it proved an important morale-booster on the home front;
and tanks did make a significant contribution during the Hundred Days’ Campaign. Given the design
weaknesses in the first machine, the Mark I, technical development during the war was remarkable:
the Medium “A” Whippet and Mark V machines proved themselves extremely versatile under the
conditions of more mobile warfare in 1918.
The most significant campaigns in other theatres took place in the Dardanelles (also referred to as
Gallipoli), Mesopotamia, Sinai and Palestine, Salonika, East Africa and on the Italian Front.
The Gallipoli Campaign symbolises the poor early performance of British command in the war.
Other Theatres
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Planning was over-optimistic. It overestimated the ability of the navy to silence the Turkish shore-
based gun emplacements. Command indecision during the initial landings at Anzac Cove and Cape
Helles in April 1915 virtually ensured failure. While a landing at Suvla Bay in August 1915 was
intended to break the deadlock, the new forces were unable to break through the Turkish defences.
Furthermore, the Allied force had to fend off furious Turkish attacks. In December 1915 and January
1916, the troops at Gallipoli were evacuated successfully. The early failure was caused by poor
command, the advantages held by the Turkish defenders and the lack of Allied experience in
amphibious operations. The fact that the evacuation was conducted successfully indicated an
improvement in military skill during the course of the campaign.[5]
Another campaign against Turkish forces was in Mesopotamia, conducted by a combined British-
Indian force, which entered Basra on 25 November 1914. Again, typically for this phase of the war, a
poor command decision led to a disastrous defeat for the British at the end of the siege of Kut-al-
Amara (December 1915-April 1916) when the British-Indian force of 13,000 men surrendered, later
suffering appalling brutality at the hands of their captors. However, a new offensive commenced in
December 1916 which led to the capture of Kut (24 February 1917). Baghdad fell the following
month. While subsequent progress was slow, Mosul was captured in October 1918 as the Ottoman
Empire collapsed. The cost of the campaign was high in terms of casualties (around 100,000, with
53,000 deaths).
The campaign in Sinai and Palestine revealed similar shortcomings. The Egyptian Expeditionary
Force, under the command of General Sir Archibald Murray (1860-1945), succeeded in the battles of
Romani (August 1916), Magdhaba (December 1916) and Rafa (January 1917), but met with failure
at the First (March 1917) and Second (April 1917) Battles of Gaza. Murray was replaced by General
Sir Edmund Allenby (1861-1936), who defeated the Turks at the Third Battle of Gaza (October 1917),
but he too made slow progress before winning the Battle of Megiddo (September 1918). The Turkish
defenders proved tough and resourceful opponents; the campaign cost the British 15,000 dead.[6]
In fact, the “peripheral theatres” reflected many trends that also appeared on the Western Front. The
weaknesses in the BEF in terms of tactics, organisation and command could be observed in the
“other theatres”. By 1916, lessons and new tactics from different theatres were starting to be shared.
Both the army and the navy had their own air forces at the start of the conflict: for the army, the
Royal Flying Corps (RFC), consisting of five squadrons, was established in April 1912; the navy
formed the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) on 1 July 1914 (with ninety-three aircraft, six airships
and two balloons). During the first twelve months of the war, both air forces operated as a naval and
military wing of the Royal Flying Corps. On 1 August 1915, the RNAS came under complete naval
control. The inter-service rivalry which ensued had a negative impact on aircraft procurement; partly
in response to this, on 1 April 1918, the Royal Air Force was formed. The central figure in the war
Air Forces
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was undoubtedly Hugh Trenchard (1873-1956), who commanded the RFC in France (August 1915-
January 1918), was chief of the air staff (January-April 1918), and then became general officer
commanding of the Independent Force and commander-in-chief of the Inter-Allied Independent Air
Force (June-November 1918).
In the early phase of the war, when British aircraft were technically inferior to German machines, air
activity was largely restricted to reconnaissance and artillery cooperation. But as the war
progressed, ground-air support and bombing missions became an integral part of British operations.
By the time of the German Spring Offensive in March 1918, the RFC was starting to match the
German air force. RFC/RAF units served mainly on the Western Front, but they did contribute to
operations in Mesopotamia, East Africa, Palestine and Italy. At the end of the war, 5,182 pilots were
serving in the RAF; total casualties for air force personnel were 9,378 killed and 7,245 wounded.[7]
When Britain went to war in 1914, strategy assumed the Royal Navy would keep the maritime routes
open, and that the British would make a small contribution to the war on land until the Central Powers
were exhausted; then, the army would take the lead in a final, victorious offensive. This would allow
Britain to take charge at the peace negotiations. Yet, as in France, Russia and Germany, by 1917 it
had become clear that the original strategy had failed. David Lloyd George’s (1863-1945) War
Cabinet could, at least in theory, have decided to reduce the number of offensives undertaken in
1917; however, they were unable to dismiss their senior military advisors, who were protected by
Unionist politicians. Although the senior military figures in London were correct that the war would
ultimately be won in France, they were unable to separate this from the belief that big offensives
were the only way to maintain pressure on the enemy.
While it would be an oversimplification to describe British field strategy until the end of 1917 as one of
“attrition”, the casualties sustained do give this impression. Over 700,000 British soldiers died in the
conflict, with a disproportionate number coming from the middle and upper classes.[8] For an island
nation, the scale of this sacrifice proved a severe shock. The performance in land warfare of the
divisions of the British Army, and of its technical, support and subordinate formations, was an
inevitable product of a variety of pressures: the lack of any recent employment of a mass army, the
fact that the General Staff had only been formed in 1904, and the myriad of tactical and operational
challenges which the war posed.
In naval warfare, Britain’s admirals proved remarkably stubborn when it came to the proposed use of
the convoy system as the best counter to the U-boat menace. That challenge aside, the fact that the
Admiralty stuck rigidly to its conservative strategy of maintaining the blockade against Germany
proved to be a major contribution to victory. With casualties of between 43,000 and 44,000 sailors in
the war, most of the dying was done by soldiers.
Since British strategy was based, for part of the war, on the desire to secure victory without an
Conclusion
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unnecessary level of financial sacrifice, at one level it can be seen as an abject failure. Still, Britain’s
military performance, seen within the context of total war, was, ultimately, very proficient. The
country proved remarkably successful both at the mobilisation of the population for the armed
services and industrial production, and in the employment of science, which included the civilian
contribution to the quality of naval and military intelligence. Despite significant setbacks, the Royal
Navy achieved what was required of it. If the army performed poorly in the first half of the war, it
underwent a process of reform in 1916 and 1917, gradually improving its tactical performance. By
1918, its coordination of infantry, artillery, tanks and aircraft through improved communications
technology and doctrine led to victory in every theatre.[9]
Alaric Searle, Nankai University
Section Editor: Adrian Gregory
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